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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A
GENERAL ZONING ORDINANCE
THOMAS A. BYRNE

T MUST be quite apparent to the casual observer that American
cities have grown up without plan or direction. Their growth has
been the result of the annexation and addition of various smaller
*communities to the. central municipality. A haphazard and unsystematic jumble has been the result. Streets have been laid out
without regularity and building lines have had no degree of uniformity.
Not the least objectionable feature of this systemless growth has been
the intrusion into residential districts of business establishments and
industrial enterprises. Such intrusion has resulted in a decrease in property values and an instability in neighborhood characteristics. These
defects in city erection became manifest some years ago to the planners
of our municipalities. A resolution to improve these faults was first
noticed in the increased activity of the legislatures and the courts in
removing nuisances and in declaring certain structures, not nuisances
per se but very discommoding to the inhabitants of the vicinity, to be
within the definitions of nuisance. A further step was taken when the
common councils of our cities declared certain blocks to be either residential or business. In the beginning these district regulations were
restricted to a few sections of the city. Gradually it became apparent
that this type of regulation was not effective and was, in effect, discriminatory of those sections not zoned. Today the effort of city
planners is toward comprehensive ordinances covering the entire
muncipality and districting it into several kinds of uses, usually residential, local business, commercial and light manufacturing, and heavy
industrial. The advantages of this type of ordinance are so clear, not
only to the expert city planner, but to the casual resident as well, that
zoning is becoming widespread in nature. Today, zoning, although it is
pioneer legislation growing out of a recent movement, is no longer experimental. The vast majority of our city-dwellers now look to this
type of legislation to foster the well-ordered grovth of our urban communities and to eliminate that lack of plan and direction which has
characterized their growth up to this time. It is significant that at
this time over four hundred municipalities of high and low degree are
protecting their future development by "means of zoning ordinances.
As a corollary, one of the most recent and satisfactory developments
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of our law is the declaration of our courts that these ordinances are
constitutional.'
Such widespread effort to systematize and beautify our cities has led
to a large number of cases which have sought to determine the invalidity of this type of legislation. It is clear that a few years ago any
law which imposed use regulations on a man's property would have
been declared contrary to the due process and equal protection clauses
of the United States Constitution. Moreover, it was very early alleged
in opposition to these laws that they were taking property without just
compensation. For it is easily apprehended that by the word "property"
as used in the Fourtenth Amendment is meant more than the mere
legal title to the land but also is meant the use and enjoyment of the
property. 2 But the last decade has seen quite a universial change in
the attitude of the courts and today we see the police power of the
state brought into play with such satisfactory results that the constitutionality of this type of legislation is no longer seriously questioned.
Assuming that more and more cities will see future desirable results
from the enactment of zoning laws it will not be vain labor to examine
the cases with a view of determining on what grounds they have been
upheld and of noting the principal objections which are made to these
ordinances by those courts which do not look upon them favorably.
While zoning laws may be looked upon as innovations in legislation
still municipalities have in the past looked to the comfort and happiness
'Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., (1926) 71 Law Ed. 171, 47 S.C.R.
114, reversing same, 297 Fed. 307, and followed in Beery v. Houghton, (1927) 71
Law Ed. 548; State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, i82 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451, 33 A.L.R.
269 with a note at 287, followed in Holzbaner v. Ritter, (I924) 184 Wis. 35, 198
N.W. 85z; Paher v. Mann, 120 Misc. 396, 198 N. Y. Supp. 548, 2o6 App. Div.
48o, 2oI N. Y. Supp. 525; State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, (1923) 97 So. 44o,
154 La. 271, 33 A.L.R. 26o; Boland v. Compagno, (Louisiana, 2923) 97 So. 66i;
Ware v. City of Wichita, (1923) 123 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99; Cohen v. Rosedale
Realty Co., (1923) 120 Misc. 416, 199 N. Y. Supp. 4; In re Cherry, (1922) 193
N. Y. Supp. 57, 196 N. Y. Supp. 92o; Cherry v. Ishister, (1922), 234 N. Y. 607,
138 N.E. 465; Schait v. Senior, (N. J., 1922) 17 Atl. 517; Cliffside Park Realty
Co. v. Borough of Cliffside, (1921) 96 N. J. L. 278; Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams, (1920) 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N.E. 2o9; Opinion of the Justices, (I92O) 234
Mass. 597, 127 N.E. 525; State ex rel. Morris v. Osborne, (192o) 32 Ohio Dec.
I97; Brown v. Los Angeles, (i92o) 283 Cal. 783, 192 Pac. 716; Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, (1915) 239 U. S. 394, aff'g Ex parte Hadacheck, (913)
i65 Cal. 416,
232 Pac. 584; Ex parte Quong Wo, (1922) i6I Cal. 22o, II8 Pac. 714.
'Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 Fed. 307, 313; -Buchanan v.

Wahrley, 245 U.S. 6o, 74, Ann. Cas. I918A, 12or. Hence it follows that restrictions on the use of property are takings within the meaning of the amendment
unless they are authorized by the reasonable use of the police power of the state..
See Also: 219 U.S. 204, 32 L.R.A.N.S.
137, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 1123 and note.

io62, Ann. Cas. I912A, 487; 226 U.S.
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of their residents and the states have offered redress to those whose
property has been injured by the existence, actual or threatened, of
objectionable buildings or businesses. In law these have been known as
nuisances and the power to regulate them has always been a component
part of the police power of the state, although it is not within the
power of the legislature to declare that to be a nuisance which is not
in fact such.3 When authorized by legislation, whether in the municipal charter or in the general statutes, municipal corporations
may enact and enforce ordinances for the abatement of public
nuisances and the preservation of public health.4 It might be
said that one of the first forerunners of the present zoning movement was the recognition of the power of municipalities to prohibit, in residential districts, industries and other uses of property,
which although not nuisances per se, were generally discommoding to
the surrounding area. 5 Equity, moreover, has always given relief to
those with a proper case who showed that there was to be a nuisance
resulting from the proposed erection of any structure in the vicinity
of their property. 6 Where the action was at law the remedy was by
way of damages. Under the common law of nuisances it has been held
in Wisconsin that numerous industries were objectionable. Thus it has
been held that a tannery conducted in the neighborhood of dwelling
houses, which, in the course of its operations, filled the surrounding air
with disagreeable, offensive, and unwholesome matter, and substantially
impaired the comfort of the dwellers nearby, was a nuisance.' The
court came to the same conclusion in regard to a plant manufacturing
acids8 and upon the same line of reasoning. The Wisconsin court has
also decided that the conduct of an undertaking and embalming business
in a neighborhood of residences operates to reduce the value of the
property in the vicinity and to destroy the peace of mind of those who
are obliged to witness the last rites of their fellow-men. But it refused
to hold the same as to a proposed veterinary hospital on a petition for
an injunction to prevent the building of the same.' 0 And a church in
a residential section is not necessarily a nuisance because it does not
reduce the value of the property in the section." A planing mill in the
Water Power Cases, 148 Wis. 124, 134 N.W. 330, 28 L.R.A.N.S. 526.
"Adams v. Milwaukee, 144 Wis. 371, 129 N.W. 518, 43 L.R.A.N.S. io66,
-affirmed in 228 U.S. 572, 57 Law Ed. 971, 33 S.C.R. 61o.
IO Minn. Law Rev. 48 and cases cited.
Teide v. Schneit, 105 Wis. 470, 81 N.W. 826.
7
Pennoyer v. Allen, 56 Wis. 50oz, 14 N.W. 6og.
8
Holinan v. Mineral Poiit Zinc Co., 135 Wis. 132, 115 N.W. 327.
Cunningham v. Miller, 178 Wis. 22, 189 N.W. 531, 23 A.L.R. 733.
Wergin v. Voss, 179 Wis. 6o3, 192 N.W. 51, 26 A.L.R. 933.
31 Cunningham v. Miller, supra.
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vicinity of the plaintiff's house, the noise and dirt from which rendered
the house uninhabitable was said to be a nuisance. 12 But an electric
light plant operating until eleven o'clock at night and emitting sound
clearly audible all over the neighborhood was held not to be actionable
in the absence of a showing of actual, physical discomfort."'
The test of whether or not industry is an actionable nuisance in a
particular neighborhood is whether the business is of such a nature as
to cause actual, material, physical discomfort to a person of ordinary
sensibilities, and this during the day and the usual hours of repose of
the parties.1 Decrease in the value of adjoining property is also
taken into consideration by the courts.15 But equity will not abate a
nuisance for a mere diminution in value.1 6 And if the nuisance is
common or public in nature it cannot be abated in an action by an
individual unless he can show that he suffers damages peculiar to himself and additional to those suffered by the people at large.1 7 And the
general rule is laid down that threatened nuisances, both public and
private, will not be enjoined except in those cases where it appears that
a nuisance will necessarily result from the act or thing which is sought
to be enjoined,1 8 or that the nuisance will cause irreparable injury to
the public, 19 and will be productive of damage which cannot be ade20
quately remedied at law.
Not alone the courts but also the legislatures of many jurisdictions
have declared certain objectionable undertakings to be nuisances and
these declarations by the legislature are now usually upheld by the
courts as constitutional if they bear some definite relationship to the
health, morals, or safety of the public. 1 But even so brief a review of
the authorities as is given above shows that there is a lack of certainty
and uniformity in the decisions of the courts, such as lack, indeed, that
" McCann v. Strang, 97 Wis. 551, 72 N.W. 17.
"Rogers v. John Weeks Lumber Co. 117 Wis. 5, 93 N.W. 821.
"McCann v. Strang, supra.
Cunningham v. Miller, supra.
Janesville Bridge Co. v. Stoughton, i Pin. 667.
Greene v. Nunnemacher, 36 Wis. 50; Clark v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 70 Wis.
593, 36 N.W. 326; Zettel v. West Bend, 79 Wis. 316, 48 N.W. 379; Anstee v.
Fuel Co., 171 Wis. 291, 177 N.W. 26.
" Wergin v. Voss, supra.
"State v. Carpenter,68 Wis. 165, 31 N.W. 730.
Wasilewski v. Biedrzycki, 18o Wis. 633, 192 N.W. 989.
Cream City Bill Posting Co. v. Milwaukee, 144 Wis. 371; Thomas Cusack Co.
v. City of Milwaukee, 158 Wis. IOO; Mehlos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146
N.W. 882, 5I L.R.A.N.S. ioo9 (dance hall) ; previous cases referred to billboards;
St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, (1911) 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929; Thonts
Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 344, io8 N.E. 340; 3 Cornell Law
Quarterly, 135 (billboards) ; Reinian v. Little Rock, (1913) 107 Ark. 174, aff'd
in (194) 237 U.S. 171 (livery stable) ; Ex parte Quong Wo, (1911) 16i Cal. 220,
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is was often difficult to predict whether or not a certain enterprise
would or would not be declared a nuisance in a particular locality. The
business man was subjected to the danger of erecting a costly business
on a piece of property which he had been able to obtain at an advantageous price only to be perpetually enjoined from pursuing it after it had
been completed and operated for a time. The owner of adjoining
property could not in all cases obtain an injunction at the start of operations in such a way as to save himself the expense of litigation, protect
his property from a possible decrease in value, and save the proposed
enterprise from injunctional proceedings until after it was too late
to save great expense. Both the owners of abutting property and
the promotors of various kinds of business enterprises have suffered
from the dependence of the old system of nuisance regulation upon
actual litigation as a means of protecting property values.
It was only natural that the indefiniteness, uncertainty, and inadequacy of the old system would make it unfit to cope with the increasing
complexity of city life and would lead to some new system of fostering
healthy commercial and industrial growth consistently with proper
municipal planning and the protection of the residential sections of the
city. 22 Business men were looking for safety in the location of their
enterprises and home owners sought surety that their establishments
would be left undisturbed by the encroachmen'ts of undesirable occupants in the vicinity. The result has manifested itself in the increase
in the number of comprehensive zoning laws throughout the country.
Zoning bears a very definite relation to nuisance regulation but at the
same time it is based on several different considerations. Nuisance law
dealt with the harmful, objectionable, or injurious use of property.
Zoning deals with the injurious use of property just as did nuisance
regulation but in addition it deals with mere differences in the character
of activity which is to take place on the premises. It consists in the
prior prescription of regulations which attempt to treat each section of
23
the city "according to its own peculiar needs, present and prospective."
118 Pac.

714 (laundry) ; Ex parte Hadaczeck, supra (brick kiln) ; 91 Neb. ioi,
135 N.W. 376, 4o L.R.A.N.S. 898 and note (1912) (brick kiln); Ex parte Montgomtery, (1912) 163 Cal. 457, 125 Pac. 2O7O (lumber yard); 219 Mich. 573, 189
N.W. 54 (1922) (junk yard) ; Brozm v. Los Angeles, (ig2o) 183 Cal. 783, 192
Pac. 716; Meager v. Kesler, 147 Minn 182 (192o); Leland v. Turner, (1925)
i17 Kan. 294 (undertaking parlors) ; City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co.,
193 Iowa io96, 184 N.W. 823 (gasoline filling station); 263 Ill. 368, 105 N.E.315,
L.R.A. 1915 D, 6o7 (garage); Salt Lake City v. Western Foundry Co., 55 Utah
447, 187 Pac. 829 (2920) ; Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, (1878) 97 U.S. 659; 142
Minn. 28, 17o N.W. 853 (1919) (flour mill).
2
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311.
"Swan, "Law of Zoning," 524; Bettman, "Constitutionality of Zoning," 37
Harv. Law Rev. 834; McNitt, "Law of Zoning," 2.
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It partakes of the character of the injunctional jurisdiction of equity to
prevent nuisances, save that the regulations are statutory in nature and
suit need not ordinarily be resorted to in order to work out the rights
of the parties. Zoning is not so much directed against objectionable
enterprises singly and of themselves but is intended to exclude them as
a class. Incidentally, of course, it excludes, many things which in
themselves are innocent: This incidental exclusion of innocent businesses has been one of the chief objections to the constitutionality of
these laws. On this point the Supreme Court of the United States has
spoken as follows:
The court cannot say as a matter of law that the end in view in the
passage of a zoning ordinance was not sufficient to justify the exclusion
of all industries from the sections set apart for residences although
some 24industries of an innocent character may fall within the proscribed
class.

Zoning, therefore, is not an ultra-refined form of nuisance regulation.
It is an extension of the police power to meet new situations which
nuisance law was inadequate to control. All the efforts of the past to
restrict the objectionable use of property make the zoning of today
possible.
Since the constitutionality of such zone ordinances is now fairly
assured it is clear from the cases that the ground of affirmance is
police power rather than eminent domain.2 5 The police power has
again been extended to meet changing economic and social conditions.
The general welfare of the urban population has been seen by the
courts to depend on the systematic regulation of city growth and it is
now fairly well assured that such changes can be met and served legally
by new methods of city planning made possible by the exercise of the
police power of the state. As a Western supreme court puts it:
As a commonwealth develops politically, economically, and socially,
the police power likewise develops, within reason, to meet the changed
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra.
' On this point there has been an interesting development in Wisconsin. In
Pera v. Village of Shorewood, (1922) 176 Wis. 261, 186 N.W. 623, the court said
that zoning might be done by means of eminent domain. In Piper et al. v. Ekern,
(1923)
i8o Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159, the court refused to sustain an act of the
legislature prohibiting the erection of buildings more than ninety feet high in the
square surrounding the state capitol on the ground that no, compensation was to
be paid the owner for the restricted use of the property. In State ex rel. Carter
v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451, 33 A.L.R. 269, the court upheld a comprehensive zone ordinance and distinguished the previous case on the ground that
the restriction in that case was for the special benefit of one piece of property,
the state capitol. The ground of affirmance in the Carter case was police power.
A similar development took place in Minnesota. See: IO Minn. Law Rev. 48 and
cases cited.
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and changing conditions. What at one time was regarded as an improper exercise of the police power, may now, because of changed
living conditions, be regarded as a legitimate exercise of that power. 21
So that we may conclude, very tritely, indeed, that if the constitutionality of zoning laws is to be sustained on the ground that they are a
reasonable and legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, the
ordinance must bear some substantial relationship to the health, morals,
security, 'comfort, and general welfare of the people.
At the outset it may be o6jected, as it frequently has been in the past,
that zoning is done primarily for esthetic reasons, and as done for such
purposes is an invalid exercice of the police power. Probably the explanation of this objection may be found in the great wave of home
building which has swept this country in the last few years. From
Atlantic to Pacific, in large cities and small, there has recently been a
notable increase in the number of home owners. Presently there is a
great deal of subdividing going on in the suburban sections. Contractors and builders now devote considerably more attention to the
architectural details of the small home than ever before. Consistent
architectural design may now be had by men of moderate means as
well as by the wealthier classes. The nondescript characteristics which
formerly distinguished the residential neighborhoods of the working
class from those of the professional and commercial classes are begining
rapidly to disappear in the newer Sections of our cities. An increase of
the beauty of all types of residential neighborhoods is the product of the
skill of the subdivider and homebuilder and of the desire of the modest
home owner to preserve the residential character of his neighborhood.
On its face this modem activity would seem to have as- its principal
motive the beautification of the residence sections by the prescription
for them of proper use regulations. Hence the proposition that zoning,
being principally esthetic in character, is invalid as an exercise of the
police power.
The courts, however, have not seen fit to look upon zoning ordinances
as legislation based merely on esthetic considerations. But one court,
that of Kansas, has seen in these laws a predominance of the esthetic,
and, contrary to the weight of authority, has squarely held zoning for
such reasons to be valid as an exercise of the police power.2 7 On the
contrary, the courts have usually affirmed the proposition stated above
that a zoning law to be valid under the police power must bear some
substantial and cognizable relationship to the health, morals, security,
comfort, and general welfare of the public. Courts deciding against
'Miller v. Board of Public Works, (Cal., 1925) 234 Pac. 381.
= Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99.
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zoning have not seen the relationship ;2" courts upholding these laws
have pointed out that a very definite relationship exists. Decisions, to
be examined later, will show that it requires no strained reasoning or
mental somersaults to see the connection between health, morals, and
general welfare, and laws which segregate the various activities of a
city into their properly appointed places. Once decided that there is
such a substantial relationship as is referred to above the cases hold
that the incidental presence of esthetic considerations does not invalidate the law.2" The cases recognize that in city planning, as in
the great majority of other human activities, the esthetic is not easily
separable from the material and the utilitarian. On this proposition
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has made a statement in State ex rel
Carter v. Harper, supra, which is now widely quoted:
* *
*it seems to us that esthetic considerations are relative in
their nature. With the passing of time social standards conform to
new ideals. As a race our sensibilities are becoming more refined, and
that which did not offend cannot now be endured. The rights of
property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure of an ultra-esthetic
taste. But whether they should be permitted to plague the dominant or
average human sensibilities may well be pondered.
While it is true that esthetic considerations are not alone sufficient
to validate the zoning ordinance 0 and the courts have usually upheld
the ordinances on other grounds, so that it may be said to be the weight
of authority still that esthetics are not a proper basis for the exercise
of the police power, there is a noticeable tendency on the part of courts
to inject the element of beauty into the reasoning of their opinions.
They recognize that the element of beautification is not absent in the
plans of city commissions. It is not hazarding too long a guess to say
that many courts are unwilling to hold the ordinances constitutional on
'State ex rel. Westminster Presbyterian Church v. Edgecomb, 2O8 Neb. 859,
189 N.W. 617; State ex rel. Penrose Investnmitt Co. v. McKelvey, (Mo., 1923);
City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, (Mo., I9z3); State ex rel. Better Built Home and
Mortgage Co. v. McKelvey, (Mo., 1923), 256 S.W. 474, 489, "495. It will be
noted that the Nebraska case involved area restrictions only. "With the exception
of the Missouri cases, every adverse decision is expressly limited to a single piece
of property, or to a single provision in the ordinance, though the process of reasoning is logically inconsistent with the theory of zoning. The Missouri Court
alone has expressly decided against zoning; but even here questions of statutory
or charter powers, as distinguished from constitutional issues, were involved,
and exerted a marked influence upon some of the judges of the court." Bettman,
"Constitutionality of Zoning," 37 Harv. Law Rev. 834.
State ex rel. Carterv. Harper, supra, followed in Holzbaner v. Ritter, supra.
'State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, supra; Cusack v. Chicago, supra, affirmed in
242 U.S. 526; St. Louis Poster A1vertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269;
Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127 N.E. 525.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING ORDINANCE

these grounds merely because of the numerous precedents which compel
them to do so, and not because of any real reluctance to recognize the
esthetic reasons for the plans. Is it not entirely possible that in the
next few years we will find the courts recognizing esthetics as a proper
basis for the exercise of the police power? The court of Louisiana
gives us an illuminating lead in this regard, 3 1 which, when added to the
Kansas case cited previously, and to several others 32 shows some
slight tendency toward this recognition.
If by the term "esthetic considerations" is meant regard merely for
outward appearances, for good taste, in the matter of the beauty of the
neighborhood itself, we do not observe any substantial reason for saying
that such consideration is not a matter of the general welfare. The
beauty of a fashionable residence neighborhood in a city is for the
comfort and happiness of the residents of the neighborhood, and it
sustains in a general way the value of property in the vicinity. It is,
therefore, just as much a matter of the general welfare as any other
condition that fosters comfort and happiness, and consequent values
generally in the neighborhood. Why should not the police power avail
as well to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending the
-sense of sight as to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by
offending the sense of hearing, or the olfactory nerves? An eyesore in
a neighborhood or residences might be as much a public nuisance, and as
ruinous to property values in the neighborhood generally, as a disagreeable floise or odor, or a menace to safety or health. The difference
is not in principle but in degree.
Another, and probably the chief reason, why courts have not decided
the question of esthetics as a basis for the exercise of the police power,
is that there are many other grounds, long recognized as proper bases
for the exercise of that power, on which these ordinances can legitimately be sustained. There is an undeniable relationship existing between the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the public, and
the enactment of reasonable zoning laws. In the matter of police protection, fori example, the proper zoning of large cities into residential
and business districts makes for the more efficient and less costly adminstration of the police force. It is well known that neighborhoods
consisting of homes are less in need of elaborate patrolling than are
those districts in which are located stores and other businesses which
are prey for .the thief and the robber. Patrolmen need not be so
numerous in these neighborhoods. Business houses furnish an excuse
for criminals to get into residence districts, meanwhile being under
no suspicion for being so there, while in a home neighborhood it would
31

State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 54 La.
'Cochran v. Preston, IO8 Md. 22, 7o AtI. 113,

271, 97 So. 440, 33 A.L.R. 260.
23 L.R.A.N.S. 1163; Welch v.
Swazey, 193 Mass 364, 79 N.E. 745, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 116o, affirmed in 214 U.S. 91.
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not be so. Shops and other business houses invite idlers, loafers, and
loose characters, to congregate, thus aggravating the ever present danger
from this element to the women and children whose proper sphere is
in the residence section.
Another important consideration is efficiency in traffic control. Where
there is a proper distribution of the large office buildings which now
feature our business life there is less likelihood of traffic congestion
during the "rush hours." The complete demoralization of traffic in the
business sections of some of our large cities at those times when these
monstrous, skyscraping buildings discharge their human armies into
the streets is a clogged and halting testimonial to the lack of plan which
placed these huge structures on streets which are unable efficiently to
handle the numbers of people which are discharged into them. Nowadays most of the people employed in these buildings are obliged to depend
on motive transportation to get them to and from their work. The impossibility of concentrating street cars and busses in the down town sections in sufficient numbers to clear the streets of the people disgorged
into them at certain hours has become the despair of transportation officials. The tendency of the professional classes is more and more to
drive to work in their own machines but the impossibility of providing
proper parking space for these machines during those hours of the day
when they are unused will put an effective stop to this practice unless
something is done to remedy the situation. Of course it is obviously a
hopeless task to remedy completely the situation in the older sections of
the city but the hopes of the city planners, as manifested in the modern
zoning ordinance, is to provide proper facilities for the future by placing
limits on heights of buildings and by regulating the areas in which they
may be built, so as to learn a lesson from the past in the proper distribution of traffic.
In this connection the question of street paving is important. The
concentration of business and manufacturing establishments into their
proper sections results in like concentration of the heavy traffic incident
to these industries into the districts provided for them. Heavy traffic
requires a substantial type of paving and the city is necessitated to
put this kind of paving only in sections where it is most needed. Heavy
trucks, as a rule, have less reason to travel in residence sections and the
city may pave these parts with the cheaper materials more suited to
passenger machines and light delivery trucks. This results in a decided
economy to the municipality. The corresponding reduction in necessary taxes for these purposes is a benefit to the general welfare of the
people in these sections and is clearly a measure reasonably within the
purview of the police power of the city.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING ORDINANCE

The reasoning which is applicable to the needs of more police protection in business districts is likewise applicable to the fire-hazard.
It is clear that more dangerous fires requiring heavier types of equipment are likely to occur in sections devoted to trade and industry. In
the residential, districts lighter equipment may be maintained at a less
expense to the city. The forces of men needed to combat blazes in
manufacturing centers necessarily are greater than those required to
fight the ordinary residence fire. Here again there can be a substantial
saving to the taxpayers as a result of -azone plan which segregates these
commercial establishments from the home. And who will assert that
such a promotion of the efficiency of the fire-fighting forces of a city
at a lesser cost to the taxpayers is not a valid exercise of the police
power?
All the reasons mentioned above have been taken into consideration
by those courts which have upheld the validity of zoning ordinances.8 3
There are further reasons which may be summarized shortly. Property
values in residential neighborhoods are increased and stabilized by the
exclusion of business uses; the health of women and children is
assured because of the absence of the smoke and noise incident to
manufacturing; living conditions are improved and the handling of
administrative problems is facilitated. In the words of Mr. Justide
Owen of the Wisconsin Court:
The benefits to be derived to cities adopting such regulations may be
summarized as follows: They attract a desirable and assure a permanent citizenship; they foster pride in and attachment to the city;
they promote happiness 'and contentment; they stabilize the use and
and promote the peace, tranquillity, and good order
value of property
34
of the city.

Certainly there is no undue extension of the police power of the state
when it is expanded to meet the needs outlined above. All will agree
that the orderly improvement of the growth of our cities is one of the
most pressing needs of this stage of American municipal development.
It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to
all great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held . .

.

.by strong or preponderant opinion to be

greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.3 5

'State ex rel. Carter v. Harper,supra; followed in Holzbauer v. Ritter, 184
Wis. '35, 198 N.W. 8 2; Miller v. Board of Public Works, (Cal. 1925) 234 Pac.
381; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, (Cal. 1925) 234 Pac. 388; Opinion of the
Justices, 234 Mals. 597, 127 N.E. 525; Fritz v. Messer, (Ohio, igz5) 149 N.E. 30;
Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Com. 357, III Atl. 354, 12 A.L.R. 669.
" State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, supra.
' Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. lo4; see also Streich v. Board of
Educatio=, 34 S.D. 169, 147 N.W. 779, L.R.A. I915A, 632, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 76o.
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The police power of the city in expanding to meet these new municipal needs must extend and expand within certain well-defined limits if
it is to be held constitutional by the courts. It is generally well settled
than an enabling act of the legislature is necessary to confer the zoning
power on the cities. This is for the reason that such function is part
of the reserve power of the state, properly resident in the state, and
improperly exercised by the municipality unless granted to it by express
legislative enactment. Most of the zoning ordinances now in force
in the cities of the country are properly enabled to the legislature and
the weight of the decisions is in favor of this procedure. 36 The contrary theory holds that zoning by municipalities is a proper exercise of
their function if there is no constitutional prohibition against such
municipal activity. But this theory will not attain to any great degree
of popularity with those courts which properly understand and interpret the constitutional and municipal law as applied to the police
power. Strictly, all power possessed by municipalities is delegated
power and must be strictly granted rather than by implication. There
is at least one case which holds this doctrine applicable.37 But the Wisconsin rule seems to be that the authority of a city to legislate upon a
particular subject within its police power, need not be given to such
city expressly or unmistakably, but if the general terms of its charter
' In Wisconsin zoning by municipalities is regulated and allowed by several
enabling acts of legislature. The general act for cities contained in Chap. 62,
Laws of 1923, Sec. 62.23. Under the authority of this act is the City of Milwaukee adopting a comprehensive zoning ordinance of the most approved type, this
ordinance being Chap. ilia, of the Milwaukee Code, Sections 26.3 to 26.77. The
provisions of this act have gone to the courts in several cases, one of which,
State ex tel. Carter v. Harper, cited supra, has become a leading case on zoning
and is frequently referred to by courts and text-writers. The act provides for
four classes of uses. The property of the relator was a business building within
a residence district. The ordinance provided that no nonconforming use might
be enlarged. The court, by Owens, J., held that the ordinance was valid. "We
do not doubt that the attainment of these objects affords a legitimate field for
the exercise of police power." The doctrine of this case is followed in Holzbauer
v. Ritter, 184 Wis. 35, 198 N.W. 852, in which it was held that it was not an
improper classification because the ordinance provided for the exclusion of community stores from residential districts. There are several other acts. In Chap.
61, Laws of 1923, Sec. 61.35, it is provided that villages in counties having a
population of 250,000 or more may provide zoning regulations. In Section
343.461, Laws of 1925, provisions are made for the regulation of the height of
buildings in all cities. This section has been held not to apply to villages or
farming communities. Nor did it apply to a building partly constructed but not
completed when the section was enacted. It is not retroactive and does not deny
equal protection of the laws. Building Heights Cases, 181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 554' Clements v. McCabe, (Mich. 192o) 177 N.W. 722; also see Levy v. Mravlag,

(N.J.L. 1921) 115 Atl. 350.
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show a reasonably clear purpose to clothe the municipality with such
power, that is sufficient. 38 The municipality, being a part or subdivision
of the state, the police power of the municipality is a subdivision of
the police power of the state. The state may delegate its legislative
power to a municipal division of the state and not offend against the
general rule that legislative power may not be delegated.39 But the very
delegated nature of the power would seem to stamp as correct the
doctrine that zoning power must be strictly granted by a proper enabling
act.
Here we should pause for a minute and summarize what has been
said thus far as to the validity of zoning laws. A zoning ordinance
must bear some cognizable relation to the health, morals, security, and
general welfare of -the people; it must be based on an enabling act.
We may now, go on a bit and decide that zoning laws, although they
may be constitutional as a class, must, in particular cases, be reasonable.
The question of the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is an interesting one. Upon wyhat consideration must the reasonableness of the
ordinance be determined? Obviously, all the cases which will seek to
impeach the validity of such type of legislation will be based on the
damage which the ordinance will allegedly do to a particular piece of
property. Shall the reasonableness of the law be determined by its
effect on the single piece of porperty, or shall not the whole law in
its workings with regard to all the property in the district be the test?
On this point there is a conflict in the authorities, not expressed or
recognized, so much as actual. The general rule under which all
cases are decided is that the restrictions imposed by the ordinance
shall be uniform upon all the persons and property within the zone.
The operation of the ordinance must be similar on the persons and
property similarly situated.
It is obviously impossible to lay down any general rule for reasonableness at the present time. The cases have been so few and the jurisdictions so widely separated both as to geography and legal tendency
that it will be some time -before any settled rule of reasonableness will
be announced by the courts. It is doubtful whether the courts could
lay down any such rule. Every case must depend on its individual cirMehios v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N.W. 882, 51 L.R.A.N.S. ioOg. See
also City of Superior v. Roemer, 54 Wis. 345, 141 N.W. 250.
'Fox v. McDonald, ioi Ala. 51, 13 So. 416, 21 L.R.A. 529; Brodbine v.
Revere, x82 Mass. 598, 66 N.E. 6o7.
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cumstances. It is interesting to note the few cases which have been
decided on this point to date.40 In Isenbarth v. Bartnett the property in
question was a piece usually and 'properly devoted to business uses.
Merely to preserve the vista for a certain private park the property was
zoned as residential and the value of it was redtuced from $55,000 to
$17,000. This was properly held by the New York court to be unreasonable and arbitrary. A somewhat similar case was decided in
Wisconsin. 41 An act of the legislature prohibited the erection of buildings over ninety feet high around the state capitol building in order to
lessen the fire hazard to the capitol and the valuable records contained
therein. Plaintiff, an owner of property on the square, sought to
restrain the operation of this act against his property. Even despite
the fact that the act was designed for the protection of the state capitol
the court refused to hold that this was a proper exercise of the police
power and remarked that some compensation should have been paid
for the property which was *to be taken in this way. There is some
similarity in these cases in that they both concern regulations which
were intended for the benefit of a single piece of property.
A radically different view of the situation is taken in Ex parte Hadacheck 42 where the question concerned the reasonableness of a pecuniary
injury done by a use ordinance to the property of the plaintiff. The
property was a brick yard which had been built years before the passage
of the ordinance on land considerably removed from the settled section
of the city. As a brick yard the property was worth $8oo,ooo; as residential property it was worth but $6o,ooo. Later the city built out to
the location of the yard and the city passed a use regulation directed
against brickyards. The ordinance was upheld by the California court
and the decision of that tribunal was upheld by the United States Supreme Court when the case was taken there on appeal. The most
recent case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., involved a comprehensive zoning ordinance not an isolated use regulation such as was
at issue in the Hadacheck case. The land in question was located in
an unimproved portion of the village and ordinarily would have been
used for commercial or apartment purposes. The zoning ordinance of
the village declared the property to be residential as to a substantial

40206

App. Div. 546,
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N.Y. Supp. 383.

"Piper et al. v. Ekern, i8o Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159, 34 A.L.R. 32, discussed
in 8 Minn. Law Rev. 248 and io Minn. Law Rev. 48.
"165 Cal. 416, affirmed as Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394.
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part. The rest of it was to be apartment or commercial. In the ordinance every section of the city zoned as "Residential I" might include
only single-family dwellings. The contention of the relator was that
the exclusion of apartment uses from his property constituted a discrimination since the property would normally have been used for those
purposes. In a decision' reversing the United States court for Ohio the
43
Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not unreasonable.
These cases bring up the question of the effect of the ordinance on
property values as bearing on the reasonableness of the law. The
Isenbarth case was correctly decided. There the application of the
ordinance to the particular piece of property was arbitrary and unreasonable. The Piper case, while not strictly a zoning case, is a correct decision on the application of the police power to the property in
question. The rule in the Hadacheck case, that pecuniary injury from
the exercise of the police power does not indicate violation of the constituti6 nal limitations, is now well settled. There is no vested right in
the proper exercise of the police power, and if the plan is genuinely
comprehensive and reasonable as a whole, the fact that it may incidentally affect adversely the values of one dr more pieces of property,
does not invalidate the ordinance. Moreover, as soon as the courts
enter into the reasonableness of zoning laws with such minuteness and
detail as to determine the value of each property affected by it, the
courts become administrative rather than legal tribunals. Were the
law to be tested by this .process of questioning the comprehensive
nature of the .ordinance is lost sight of and the forest cannot be seen
on account of the trees. It has been held that in such cases as are
brought up by zoning regulations the determinative question is not so
much private rights as it is the reasonableness and advantage of the
entire plan considered as a whole."
The reasonableness of the plan would also seem to be dependent to
some extent on the comprehensiveness of the ordinance. One of the
stages in the history of zoning is marked by the introduction of the
block or district type of zoning regulation by which a certain isolated
street was declared to be residential or business. These ordinances have
been held constitutional by some courts but it is clear that 5 they are
47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114, 71 Law Ed. 171, reversing Amnbler Realty Co. v. Village
of Euclid, 297 Fed. 3o7.
"Jardine v. City of Pasadena, 248 Pac. 225 (Cal.).
"State ex rel. Banner Grain Co. v. Houghtm, 142 Minn. 28, 17o N.W. 853;
Salt Lake City v. Western etc. Works, 55 Utah 447, 187 Pac. 829; Knack v.
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not so reasonable as is a comprehensive ordinance. As stated before,
they are in effect discriminatory as to the property not zoned. Many
courts have seen this and have declared these block ordinances invalid.4"
The growth of zoning has brought it to our attention that a zoning law
need not contain all the modern comprehensive ordinance contains in
order to be held constitutional. It may regulate height alone and be
valid. 4 A use regulation was upheld in the Hadacheck case4 ' while
set-back lines were declared constitutional in Tozru of Windsor v. Whitney.49 It is well settled by the later cases that an ordinance may contain regulations for height, use, and bulk. The comprehensive law
is entitled to be called constitutional because it is not in fact so arbitrary
or discriminatory as is the block districting ordinance. Under the latter type of plan property in one "zone" or part of the city receives
different treatment than does the same kind of property in another part
of town. The piecemeal ordinance is the result of no plan; it is haphazard; it is but slightly more effective than no regulation at all. But
the comprehensive ordinance is based on an extensive survey of the
needs of the city both present and future. It takes into consideration
all the facts of the city's future growth, population, distribution, traffic
conditions. In other words the ordinance which contains all types of
regulation-height, bulk, and use-is the more effective type of ordinance and hence the more reasonable. The comprehensive ordinance is
the plan of the entire municipality seeking the best possible districting
for the benefit of all.
In answering the question which was previously asked whether the
reasonableness of the plan should depend on its thoroughness as a whole
or upon its effect on individual pieces of property it is necessary to
conclude from the history of the movement, from the decisions of the
courts, and from the logic of the situation that the comprehensive type
Scrap Co., 219 Mich. 573, 189 N.W. 54; Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193
Iowa bo96, 184 N.W. 823; Reinman v. Little Rock, 107 Ark. 174, 237 U.S. 171.
"'Friendv. Chicago, 261 Ill.
16, 1O3 N.E. 609; Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320,
130 Pac. 828; State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N.W.
1017; State ex rel. Roerig v. Vinneapolis, 136 Minn. 479, 162 N.W. 477; Clements
v. McCabe, 21o Mich. 207, 177 N.W. 722; Roinar v. Com. of Haddonfield, 96
N.J.L. 117, 114 At!. 248; Levy v. Mravlag, 96 N.J.L. 367, 115 At. 350; Spann v.
Dallas. iii Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513; In re Kensington Davis Co., 239 N.Y. 54,
145 N.E. 738.
" Welsh v. Swazey, 193 Mass. 364, 77 N.E. 745, 214 U.S. 91; Kemp v. D'Oench,
iii N.Y. 359, 18 N.E. 862; Cochran v. Preston, io8 Md. 220, 70 At. 113.
"Supra, 165 Cal. 416, 132 Pac. 584, 239 U.S. 394.
42 95 Conn. 357, III At!.
354.
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of ordinance is more reasonable than the piecemeal law by reason of its
very comprehensiveness. Following this logic further we should conclude that the thoroughness of the entire plan as applied to the whole
municipality should be the test of the reasonableness of the ordinance.
Certainly all the facts which entered into the adoption of the plan by
the Planning Commission should be taken into consideration in determining its reasonableness. A scheme which considers the future of the
city along social and economic lines; which considers the channels
which the future growth of the city will take, which has been honestly
made so as to facilitate this future expansion, is a plan best calculated
to be reasonable in its operation. For these reasons the survey on
which the plan is based, and the testimony of the experts who made
the survey as to just how the final ordinance will further the health,
morals, and general welfare of the city, are evidence of the reasonableness of the plan. The Wisconsin court in upholding a height ordinance solely, stated that "a zoning law would be a more scientific
and satisfactory way of regulating the height and character of buildings."5 o
Of course the ordinance cannot entirely disregard the rights of the
private owner. In the last analysis both the entire thoroughness of the
plan and its immediate effect upon single pieces of property are evidences of reasonableness. Mr. Bettman, one of the leading authorities
in the country on the law of zoning, has this to say:
The failure to realize the significance of the comprehensive nature
of the ordinance in some cases has led, and until corrected, will continue to lead courts into an illogical attitude of keeping their eyes
solely on the piece of property of the plaintiff and the immediately
"adjacent or neighboring lots, thus permitting the constitutionality of
the plan of a city to turn on evidence concerning a very small fraction
of its territory.
And again, at another place he says, speaking of the decisions adverse
to the constitutionality of zoning ordinances:
With the exception of the Missouri cases every adverse decision is
expressly limited to a single piece of property .

.

.

. though the pro-

cess of reasoning is logically inconsistent with the theory of zoning.5'

These statements clearly indicate the views of Mr. Bettman that the
comprehensive and entire reasonableness of the plan is the test of its
constitutionality and that the element of damage to the property of any
Atkinson v. Piper, 195 N.W. 545.
' Bettman, "Constitutionality of Zoning," 37 Harv. Law Rev. 834, 845.
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individual should be secondarily considered. This theory is, on the
whole, correct. But there is in it a very great danger, a danger which
manifests itself to the conservative rather than to the progressive mind
perhaps, but a danger which is first considered by the'person whose
regard for the sacred rights of property is paramount in his mind to
considerations of public welfare. No one will deny, much less the
writer, that the effect of zone plans on our American cities is bound to
be beneficial in its entirety. But the question occurs when one reads
the Hadacheck case and the Euclid case as to just where we are going
in our jealous regard for the rights of the individual to the full use and
enjoyment of his property. This question may resolve itself at some
future time into a conflict between those two philosophical camps, the
one insisting strongly on the general welfare and the other insisting
equally as vigorously on the protection of the rights of the individual.
The contention of the present writer is that the benefits of the plan
should be obtained for the municipality if such end can-be attained with
no substantial impairment of individual property rights. To be sure the
thoroughness of the plan should be one of the elements in the proof
of its reasonableness, but the court should never neglect to inquire into
the application of the scheme to the property in the instant case. It
would seem that there are two tests of the reasonableness of a zoning
ordinance: first, is the plan as a whole sound, that is, is the plan reasonably related to the health, morals, or general welfare, and second, is
the scheme of classification and districting applied fairly and equally in
52
each instance.
The basis of the foregoing criticism, of course, is the depreciation in
the monetary value of the petitioner's property due to the passage of.
the zoning ordinance, without any corresponding compensation from
the public for whose benefit the property is taken. The answer to this
objection is that really the property is not being taken for Public purpose at all 53 and that no compensation need be paid.

But the owner

is compensated by the like restrictions which are placed on the property of his neighbors. His property is treated in exactly the same way
as the lot next door, and so on, down the block and throughout the
zone. The enforced co-operation of all those similarly situated for the
common good will, save in rare cases, operate to increase the value of

'Miller v. Board of Public Works, (Cal.) 234 Pac. 381.
'See Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Conznissioners, 1O4 Ohio St. 447,
135 N.E. 635.
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the plaintiff's property rather than to decrease it. Whether or hot the
monetary value of the property is increased certainly the beauty and
usefulness of the land is enhanced by the like restrictions which are
placed on .all the property in the vicinity. All the property being zoned
as residential, for example, all business uses are excluded, noise and
smoke are eliminated from the life of the district, the esthetic effect is
increased, life is made more livable and worthwhile, and the general
efficiency of the neighborhood for the residential purposes for which it
was set aside, is considerably increased. It is only in the exceptional
case that zoning decreases the value of the property; but it is submitted
that values, both monetary and personal, are, on the whole, sustained by
zoning ordinances, and that the unregulated use of property causes
more depreciation than does the scientific districting of a municipality.
In the case of State ex rel Carter v. Harper, supra, an interesting
question of reasonableness is raised. Under the Milwaukee ordinance
any building or other structure may be erected and used in any location
by a public service corporation for any purpose which the state Railroad Commission may decide. is reasonably necessary for the public
convenience or welfare.5 4 Relator contended- that this was unreasonable because of an improper and invalid classification which resulted in
a discriminatory treatment of property. On this point the court said:
When it is remembered that such buildings are erected to promote
the comfort and convenience of the public, and that it is within the
power of the state to compel such erection, it would appear that this
constitutes a reasonable and valid classification. It must be apparent
that an ordinance enacted pursuant to state authority which prevents
the erection of buildings or the conduct of business deemed inimical to
the public interest, need not also prohibit the erection of buildings and
the conduct of business which is essential to the comfort and convenience of the public, and which the duly constituted authority of the
state determines to be necessary for the public service, which a public
utility is required to render. A similar provision received consideration
in the Opinion of the Justices15 where it was said that the provision
"is within the settled principles of legislative control over property
devoted to that use."
Having seen in a general way that regulations of the height, bulk,
and use of property, now referred to as zoning laws, are constitutional
as a class if they are properly enabled and are reasonable, it would be
well to inquire just how far these ordinances may go in the division of
Milwaukee Code, Sec. 26.46.
234 Mass. 597, 127 N.E. 529.
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the city into height, bulk, and use districts. Just what may be the
bases for the districting and how must the boundaries be determined?
It was early recognized that use regulations which excluded obnoxious
uses from residence districts were constitutional as a reasonable protection of health. Some of these isolated regulations were noted
above. But zoning laws usually exclude non-obnoxious uses as well.
Here lies the dangerous question of constitutionality. This usually
arises in connection with the regulation of residential districts where,
for example, the ordinance excludes all but single family homes from a
section zoned as "Residential A." It will be admitted that the term
residential would include all types of structures used as residencessingle family houses, duplex flats, tenements, and apartments. Is it
reasonable and proper, therefore, for the council to classify such residences and require that homes containing more than one family be
built in a section of the city separate and apart from that occupied by
single homes? If it is proper on what grounds may such action be
based?
There is high authority that such legislation is reasonable and constitutional. 56 The reasoning of some of the cases, it is true, is rather
strained, based on the idea that apartment houses in residence sections
partake of the character of nuisances. In the Euclid case Mr. Justice
Sutherland remarks that they come "very near to being nuisances." At
any rate the courts see in multiple family dwellings many obnoxious
features from the point of view of the owner of a single house. They
point out that these larger structures shut out the light and air from the
smaller buildings; they clog the streets with many automobiles, both
parked and moving, due to the increased occupancy of the neighborhood; they generally reduce property values in the vicinity and make
the neighborhood less desirable for the single family home; soot and
smoke are spread around; and the fire hazard is undoubtedly increased.
Courts see many advantages in the pride of ownership which comes
to the man with his own property; there are manifest advantages to
the children who have private yards in which to play, yards in which
there are grass and flowers to make life more natural and beautiful;
a better citizenship, they say, will result in neighborhoods where the
young children have light and air and something more to look at than
the four walls and decorated entrance of a modern apartment house.
In the promotion of the fast degenerating family life environment plays
' Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra; State ex rel. Morris v. Osbornte, 22 Ohio N.P. 549; Twin City Building and Investment Co. v. Houghton,
144 Minn. I, 174 N.W. 885; Miller v. Board of Public Works, (Cal. 1925) 234
Pac. 381; Wulfsoln v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288.
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a great part and the courts are not the first to have said that one of
the reasons for so little family life today is that the modem family has
no home which it can call its own. The writer, for one, has always
believed that the apartment h6use of today is the incarnation of selfishness, the graveyard of domestic interests, and the destroyer of
that sense of domestic responsibility which served so well to
weld families together in those past ages when there were more
marriages than divorces. The preservation and promotion of the family
is one of the first interests of the state. Admitting the very close relationship between the home and the family it is impossible to see why
any measure which serves to preserve the family is not a valid exercise
of the police power.
That the apartment frees people from some cleaning and firing tasks
which at one time were considered indispensable family inconveniences
it is readily admitted. But life in an apartment is a community of
restrictions-restrictions which must be borne in order to enjoy the
freedom from responsibility which the apartment offers. And there is
little doubt in any one's mind that the freedom of arrival and departure which the apartment offers to its single residents has been no
small contributing factor in the violation of the moral laws. -The more
thickly occupied is a residential section the less easy is it to detect such
violations. Any police officer will testify that the work of the vice
squad has been increased tremendously since the advent of the apartment. It has tended, moreover, to create a floating element among the
citizenry of the country. Seeking an apartment so that they may shirk
domestic inconvenience they begin to shirk their social, civic, moral,
and religious obligations as well. They take less interest in the civil
government and the public schools. They have no pecuniary attachment to the community by way of taxes to compel their interest in the
administration of the public agencies. On the other hand home-owning
brings up an altogether desirable citizenry; it aids in the rearing of
children; it stabilizes the home-and the stability of the home is the
strength of the nation. Of course, to some the apartment is desirable
and to others well-nigh indispensable. But the fact that they are
necessary to some does not make them desirable to otherg. They are
not homes in the sense in which some people use the word. There
is a sufficient distinction between them and the single home to warrant
their separation into a district in which they may exist unhampered
by the disappointed protests of the home-lover. This separation would

seem to be warrantable aside from any consideration of nuisance.
The charge that the courts have gone too far in sustaining these laws
is unfounded.
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The separation of the various sections of the city into different use
districts being a proper exercise of the police power a delicate question
is raised when the boundaries for these districts are attempted to be
determined. The territory of a city is usually not marked out by any
such natural boundaries as distinguish one country from another on
the map of the world. All the ground covered by one municipality
is very much the same. Hence a certain degree of arbitrariness in the
location of zone boundaries must be expected. 57 The question has been
raised, and will coritinue to be raised, where the boundary of the zone
separates two pieces of property similar in nature, putting one piece in
a single house section and the other in a flat or apartment district. In
such case the court will not substitute its judgment as to the reasonableness of the boundary for the judgment of the legislative body
which enacted the ordinance. It is easily seen that were such objections
to govern the courts in their interpretation of the reasonableness of the
ordinance no boundaries could ever be set for the zones. If the mere
fact that outside the permissive district there existed property similar
in nature to that within the district would authorize the court to determine that this constituted an arbitrary discrimination no territorial
classification of this kind could ever be made.5
Nor is the size of
the district and the thickness or sparsity of its population an exclusive
criterion of the reasonableness of the zone boundary. 59 But while the
power of the legislative body to fix the boundaries of the zones and
their size is widely discretionary it must be exercised within some
limitations. The boundaries of the zone must be reasonable in view of
all the uses within the district; adequate provisions must be made in
order to foster all the purposes of the zone. And the zone, as created,
especially in presently existing business districts, must not be such
as to create a monopoly in favor of already existing establishments by the exclusion of the same type of business from the section
still to be occupied.60 But necessarily different treatment of the same
kind of property in different sections of the city is no ground for
declaring the law invalid as class legislation.61
Another interesting problem in connection with zoning cities already
largely built concerns the permission which is given by most of the
ordinances for the exemption of non-conforming uses from the operation of the law. A non-conforming use is any structure or business
which, were it to be erected after the passage of the ordinance, would
'Brown v. Los Angeles, 183 Cal. 783, 192 Pac. 716.
"State ex rel. Morris v. Osborne, supra.
'Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 22o, 118 Pac. 714.
,' Zahn v. Board of Public Works, (Cal. 1925) 234 Pac. 388.
" Bettman, 37 Harv. Law Rev. 834, and cases cited.
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be in violation of its terms. Such, for example, would be an apartment
house already constructed in a section later zoned only for single
family dwellings. There is authority to the effect that the ordinance
may require the removal of all non-conforming uses in existence at the
time of the passage of the ordinance. 2 There would seem to be no
question that the removal of non-conforming uses might be required
if there was any element of nuisance in the thing t6 be removed.
This inference is inescapable in view of the cases which we have seen
above authorizing the removal of nuisances by particular legislation for
that purpose under the police power .of the municipality. But on this
reasoning some element of nuisance would have to be present, and
zoning ordinances are not based on nuisance regulation exclusively.
Carrying to its logical conclusion the reasoning about general welfare
which hag been used by the courts to sustain zoning as an entirety it
would seem to be entirely proper for the legislative body to order the
removal of all uses which interfere with the operation of the plan.
In large cities the removal of all non-conforming uses would mean that
part of the city would have to be rebuilt and this would clearly result
in great hardship to numerous owners of property. There are
indications that this resulting hardship would be construed as unreasonable and unnecessary by the courts. In one Wisconsin case it was held
that prior building permits were not invalidated by subsequent changes
in zone boundaries. 6 3 Any extended attempt to make the ordinances
retroactive will meet with opposition from the courts on the ground
of unreasonableness and may result- in declaring against the constitutionality of the ordinances as a whole. No doubt it is for this
reason that most of the ordinances exempt presently existing nonconforming uses from the operatfon of the law. It has already been
objected that this exemption constitutes a discrimination against those
business establishments of the same kind which are prohibited in districts yet to be built up or forbidden to be built in the future in those
parts of the city in which they now exist. It is contended that if there
is to be a valid classification it must operate uniformly upon all
establishments like in nature and operation and that no exception may
be made in favor of a use merely because it is in existence at the
time of the passage of the ordinance. But the general opinion seems
to be that if the authority to zone exists, the ordinance enacted pursuant
to that authority need not require that all non-conforming uses be
removed. The constitutional requirement of uniformity simply means
that all the persons affected by the law applying to a particular class
Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153.

Wasilewiski v. Biedrzycki, i8o Wis. 633.

212

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

shall be uniformly treated on and after the passage of the ordinance.
The fact that such legislation is not made retrospective will not render
64
the ordinance invalid because of discrimination.
The Milwaukee ordinance seems to have arrived at a satisfactory
solution of this difficult problem. It provides that no non-conforming
use may be enlarged after the district has been zoned. This provision
of the ordinance was upheld by court 65 on the theory that no one has a
vested right to enlarge his business merely because the business was
initiated before the ordinance forbidding its enlargement was enacted.
Mr. Justice Owens reasoned that if every small business in such
section of the city had a vested right to enlarge itself it might grow
to mammoth proportions very largely defeating the purpose of the
regulation.
In this connection it is to be noted that the attempts of some
ordinances to evade the protests of property owners who wish to have
the ordinance inoperative as to a certain non-conforming use to be
erected after the passage of the law, by providing that upon the written
petition of a percentage of property owners in the vicinity of the proposed use, such use may be allowed and the ordinance suspended as
to it, have been held invalid as unlawful delegations of the legislative
power vested in the common council. In State ex rel Nehrbass v.
Harper 6 the ordinance enacted that no garage might be erected in any
residential section unless the builder first obtained the written consent
of two-thirds of the owners within three hundred feet of the proposed
use. If such signatures were obtained the operation of the ordinance
as to that garage was to be suspended. This was held invalid as an
unlawful delegation of the legislative power of the common council.
The delegation of this power to adjacent property owners, without
any restriction or limitation whatever, vests in such property owners
the power to say as a matter of discretion that another property owner
shall not be allowed to use his property in a certain way. No attempt
is made to place it on a ground of public welfare, or public health, or
any other interest which the public might have in the matter, but the
determination is left to the desire, whim, or caprice of the adjacent
owners.
The same conclusion was reached in the case of Eubank v. Richmond
by the Supreme Court of the United States. 17 Incidentally in this case
the court said that there was no question of the right of a city to
establish set-back lines. But the set-back in this case was to be deZahn v. Board of Public Works, (Cal.
'State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, supra.
1162 Wis. 589, 156 N.W. 941.
7 226 U.S. 137.

1925)

234 Pac. 388.
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termined by the consent of two-thirds of the owners in the block. The
reasoning of the court is much the same as in the Wisconsin case. No
standard is set up by which the adjacent owners shall determine whether
the use shall be allowed or not and their decision is largely based on
their personal likes and dislikes. No discretion is left in the body
which administers the law. It has been held in Wisconsin that the
taxing power cannot be delegated68 and the same reasoning would seem
to apply to adjacent owners deterniining the ise to which others shall
put their property. These decisions are carefully reasoned and it is
well that the courts have declared unconstitutional these conditional
provisions of zoning ordinances. To determine the rights of one by
the whims of another is not puttting the ordinance on any ground of
public welfare, and, moreover, no comprehensive ordinance will serve
the ends it was intended to promote if it is everywhere to be changed
to suit the desires of property owners. Zoning ordinances can be very
properly placed on definite and absolute grounds of general welfare
after a survey of the needs of the municipality. Once decided that
certain provisions of the law are valid, proper, and necessary, it should
not be left to- other owners to say whether or not the ordinance shall
be made effective as to a certain piece of property.
Rather than attempt to delegate any power to property owners the
council should create a board or commission for the administration
of the many details which arise in the enforcement of a zoning
ordinance. If the council attempts to lay out the whole scheme of
the municipality the first time the ordinance is enacted and then hold
to this form of development during the period of the ordinance the
city will be formed into an unchangeable mould which, with the growth
of the city which is bound later to occur, is bound to give rise to
hardships which will cause the law to be attacked in many cases because
of its unreasonable application in particular instances. There are many
thousands of situations in the planning of a city which will need adjustments from time to time as the growth of the city warrants. There
will- arise situations which are unforeseeable at the time of the passage
of the ordinance. To take care of these changing conditions provision
must be made for an administrative board which will have power to
make exceptions as it deems necessary consistently with the object of
the entire plan of the law. Zoning ordinances will have to be amended
from time to time and this commission should have the power to
recommend such amendments and should also have discretion to suspend or alter the operation of the ordinance without an amendment.
If this type of board is provided for the administration of the law it
"State ex rel. Carey v. Ballard, 158 Wis. 251, 148 N.W. logo.
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will result in less attacks being made on the constitutionality of the
ordinance as a whole and will reduce the attacks to reviews of the
propriety of the application of the ordinance to a particular situation.
Where a discretion is vested in a board of this kind and under this
power the board makes a finding as to a particular piece of property
which finding is unsatisfactory to the aggrieved owner the court will
not consider the ordinance as an entirety but will only review the
exercise of the discretion of the board. Its action will be allowed to
stand as final unless there is a clear abuse of the discretion. 69 In
this way the zoning ordinance will be placed on a firm ground of constitutionality. It must be added here, however, that the ordinance
should prescribe the legislative policy which is to guide the board so
that it may decide the individual cases after a proper consideration of
the facts which entered into the adoption of the ordinance. If an
absolute discretion is vested in the board without any corresponding
legislative policy by which the board may be governed the work of the
board will depend on the theories of the men rather than on the plain
intent of the ordinance. The result will be an arbitrary administration
of the ordinance. It is imperative that the actions of the administrative
body should be guided by a proper legislative policy, else the results
will be an arbitrary confusion dangerous to the whole movement."0
By way of summary it may be said that the modern zoning law
is the outgrowth of the traditional police power of the municipality
over nuisances. The modern comprehensive ordinance bears an analogous relationship to nuisance regulation but is sustained today because
it bears a substantial relation to the health, morals, security, and general
welfare. The weight of authority is to the effect that esthetic considerations alone are not enough to sustain the ordinance. The ordinance
must be enacted as a result of a proper enabling act. It must be
reasonable and there are two tests to determine this reasonableness.
Is the ordinance thorough as an entirety? Does it lack discrimination
and arbitrariness in its applications to particular pieces of property?
In the establishment of districts and the determination of boundaries
the judgment of the legislative body will control unless there is a
clearly arbitrary or unreasonable provision or unless the boundaries
as established create a monopoly. Non-conforming uses may be required to be removed but the majority of the cases seem to indicate
that if this procedure is attempted the ordinance will be declared unconstitutional because unreasonable. The fact that non-conforming
'Jardine v. Pasadena, (Cal.) 248 Pac. 225, and also the well reasoned dissent
of Bond, C. J., in Goldman v. Crowther, (Md.) 128 Atl. 50.
" On this point see McNitt, "Law of Zoning," 26.
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uses are allowed to exist and that the law is not made retroactive does
not render the ordinance invalid. An administrative board should be
created for the administration of the ordinance. The creation of such
a board will assure the constitutionality of the ordinance because the
courf wil then review only the use of the discretion of the commission
rather than the ordinance as an entirety. Lastly, the operation of the
law may not be delegated to the property owners in the municipality.

